Adapting the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in Light of United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. by Heep, Jeremy D.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1994
Adapting the Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine in Light of United States v. MacDonald &
Watson Waste Oil Co.
Jeremy D. Heep
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heep, Jeremy D., "Adapting the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in Light of United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil
Co." (1994). Minnesota Law Review. 1602.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1602
Comment
Adapting the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
in Light of United States v. MacDonald & Watson
Waste Oil Co.
Jeremy D. Heep
In United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.'
(hereinafter MacDonald & Watson), the First Circuit examined
the application of the Responsible Corporate Officer (RCO) doc-
trine to "knowing" environmental crimes. 2 Specifically, the jury
convicted the defendant, a corporate officer, of knowingly trans-
porting hazardous waste to a facility without a permit in viola-
tion of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).3
The prosecution conceded that it had no proof the defendant had
actual knowledge of the illegal shipment.4 Instead, the trial
court instructed the jury that it could find the requisite mens
rea-knowledge-based on the defendant's status as an RCO. 5
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the conviction, holding
that the RCO instruction circumvented RCRA's "knowing"
requirement.6
Enforcement of environmental crimes has increased dra-
matically over the past decade,7 and federal, state, and local
governments have been prosecuting high level corporate officers
1. 933 F.2d 35 (lst Cir. 1991).
2. Id. at 50-55. Specifically, the court analyzed the mens rea requirement
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3008(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d)(1) (1988) [hereinafter RCRA].
3. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 50. The jury found that the defend-
ant violated 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1).
4. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 50.
5. Id. at 50-51. See infra text accompanying note 74.
6. Id. at 55.
7. EPA has recently reported its criminal enforcement activity as follows:
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for environmental crimes with increasing vigor.8 Although pros-
ecutors have increasingly turned to the RCO doctrine to facili-
tate a showing of an accused's mens rea, the scope and breadth
of the doctrine remains ambiguous. RCRA's criminal provisions
provide an excellent vehicle for analysis of the RCO doctrine.9
FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92
Referrals to
DOJ 20 26 31 40 41 41 59 60 65 81 107
Cases
successfully
prosecuted 7 12 14 15 26 27 24 43 32 48 61
Defendants
charged 14 34 36 40 98 66 97 95 100 104 150
Defendants
convicted 11 28 26 40 66 58 50 72 55 82 99
Months
sentenced - - 6 78 279 456 278 325 745 963 1135
Months
served - - 6 44 203 100 185 208 222 610 744
Months
probation - 534 552 882 828 1410 1284 1045 1176 1713 2478
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT AccoMPLIsHMENTs REPORT: FY 1992
Appendix (1993).
8. Between 1983 and 1992, "[e]ighty percent [(451 of 565)] of the individu-
als prosecuted for environmental crimes were officers and managers of corpora-
tions." Barry M. Hartman & Charles A. De Monaco, The Present Use of the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in the Criminal Enforcement of Environ-
mental Laws, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10145, 10146, & n.8 (March
1993); see also Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for
Environmental Crimes, 21 ST. MARY's L.J. 821, 823 (1990) (giving reasons for
rising number of prosecutions for environmental crimes); Karen M. Hansen,
'Knowing" Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 987, 987 (1990)
(discussing importance of understanding "knowingly" requirement in light of
increasing prosecutions for environmental crimes); Larry Howell, Environmen-
tal Crimes: The Boom in "Busting" Corporations and Their Responsible Of-
ficers, 16 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoC. 417, 417-19 (1992) (describing increase in
prosecutions of corporate officials for environmental crimes); Steven M. Morgan
& Allison K. Obermann, Perils of the Profession: Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine May Facilitate a Dramatic Increase in Criminal Prosecutions of Envi-
ronmental Offenders, 45 Sw. L.J. 1199 (1991); James M. Strock, Environmental
Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the 1990s, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 916, 917-
18 (1991) (discussing EPA's increased emphasis on criminal enforcement). Cor-
porations may also face criminal prosecution. See generally Hansen, supra at
995-97 (describing the "collective knowledge" doctrine as applied to corporate
defendants); Alan Zarky, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 5 Toxics
Law Rep. (BNA) 983, 984 (January 9, 1991) (discussing employers' vicarious
liability for acts of its employees in environmental cases).
9. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (explaining how the RCO
doctrine's policy has been infused into the interpretation of "knowingly"). See
M. Diane Barber, Fair Warning: The Deterioration of Scienter Under Environ-
mental Criminal Statutes, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 105 (1992) (arguing against the
congressional trend of lowering mens rea requirements for environmental
crimes); Kevin L. Colbert, Considerations of the Scienter Requirement and the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine for Knowing Violations of Environmen-
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Resolution of the ambiguity surrounding the doctrine carries
tremendous implications for corporate officers across the coun-
try, because a violation of RCRA's criminal provisions consti-
tutes a serious felony offense. 10
The original RCO doctrine allowed juries to convict a corpo-
rate official of a strict liability crime when the officer did not
participate in or know of the crime, but had a responsible posi-
tion of authority in relation to the crime. This Comment exam-
ines the extent to which courts should modify the original
doctrine in light of the ambiguous "knowledge" requirement of
RCRA's criminal provisions. Part I focuses on judicial applica-
tion of the RCO doctrine. Part II describes the First Circuit's
decision in MacDonald & Watson and its reason for rejecting the
trial court's application of the doctrine. Part III concludes that
although the First Circuit was technically correct in its refusal
to apply the RCO doctrine as articulated in MacDonald & Wat-
son, courts should nonetheless adapt the doctrine to encompass
RCRA's "knowingly" requirement.
I. THE RCO DOCTRINE AND RCRA'S AMBIGUOUS
KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
Federal courts have generally focused on two related issues
in interpreting RCRA's criminal provisions: whether the prose-
cution must establish knowledge as to each element of a RCRA
criminal violation, and whether application of an RCO doctrine
may serve to establish knowledge of illegal acts. The RCO doc-
trine and its underlying policies are important in the resolution
of both issues.
tal Statutes, 33 S. Tux. L.J. 699, 701-02 (1992); Todd W. Grant, The Responsible
Relationship Doctrine of United States v. Park: A Tool for Prosecution of Corpo-
rate Officers Under Federal and State Environmental Laws, 11 TEMP. ENvTL. L.
& TECH. J. 203, 205 (1992); Lisa Ann Harig, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Responsible
Corporate Officers Convicted of Environmental Crimes and the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 42 Du=c L.J. 145, 147 (1992) (stating application of the RCO
doctrine to environmental statutes with scienter has resulted in reduced bur-
den of proof); Howell, supra note 8, at 440; John F. Seymour, Civil and Crimi-
nal Liability of Corporate Officers Under Federal Environmental Laws, 20 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 337, 341-43 (June 9, 1989). But see Hartman & De Monaco, supra
note 8, at 10151 (stating that the doctrine "does not eliminate, or even speak to,
the applicable statutory requirements for knowledge in criminal litigation).
10. A conviction results in a fine of up to $50,000 for each day of violation,
up to five years imprisonment, or both. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988). Addition-
ally, the court may double the maximum punishment for a second conviction.
Id. See generally Fromm, supra note 8, at 825-28 (explaining penalties con-
tained in RCRA); Morgan & Obermann, supra note 8, at 1209-13 (analyzing the
provisions in light of the federal sentencing guidelines).
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A. THE ORIGINAL RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DocTRNE
The Supreme Court developed the original RCO doctrine to
apply to strict liability statutes protecting the public welfare.
The original doctrine provides that a person may incur criminal
liability for a corporation's violation of a public welfare statute
regardless of whether he or she actually participated in or knew
about the criminal conduct, if "(1) the person was an officer of
the corporation and not merely an employee; (2) the person was
in a responsible position of authority to correct the violation; and
(3) the person failed to do so."11
The Supreme Court first articulated the RCO Doctrine in
United States v. Dotterweich,12 holding that a conviction under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) of 193813 re-
quired no showing of mens rea. 14 The Court reasoned that by
leaving a mens rea requirement out of the FDCA, Congress pre-
ferred to place the hardship of criminal prosecution with corpo-
rate officers "rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent
public who are wholly helpless."' 5 The Court reasoned that cor-
porate officers have "at least the opportunity of informing them-
selves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of
consumers."16
The specific issue in Dotterweich was whether Congress in-
tended "person" to include individuals as well as corporations. 17
In holding that the FDCA covers individual defendants, the
Court stated that this type of legislation "dispenses with the
conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of
11. This statement synthesizes the doctrine as stated in two Supreme
Court cases, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), and United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). Other commentators have extensively
treated the development of the RCO doctrine, and this Comment does not focus
on this point. See, e.g., KATLEN F. BicKEY, 1 CoRPOATE CRINAL LIABin-
rr: A TREATISE ON THE CRImNAL LiA&mrry OF CORPORATIONS, THEm O CFICERS
AND AGENTS §§ 5:15-17 (1992); Hansen, supra note 8, at 998-1000; Hartman &
De Monaco, supra note 8, at 10146-48; Morgan & Obermann, supra note 8, at
1200-04.
12. 320 U.S. 277 (1943). In Dotterweich, the jury convicted the president
and general manager of a drug company of the misdemeanor of adulterating
and misbranding drugs. Id. at 278. Nonetheless, the prosecution had made no
claim of the defendant's knowledge or participation in those illegal acts. Id. at
279 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
13. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (Supp. IV 1938).
14. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
15. Id. at 285.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 279.
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some wrongdoing."' 8 Specifically, a court may convict "all who
... have.., a responsible share in the furtherance of the trans-
action which the FDCA outlaws."' 9
Three decades later, in United States v. Park,20 the
Supreme Court detailed a prima facie RCO case against a corpo-
rate officer:
the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, respon-
sibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or
promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and... he failed to do
so. The failure thus to fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of the
corporate agentfs authority and the statute furnishes a sufficient
causal link.2
1
Central to the Supreme Court's reasoning was that the goal of
the FDCA is to protect "the health and well-being of the pub-
lic"2 2 and that corporate officers stand "in [a] responsible rela-
tion to a public danger."2 3 The Court emphasized that in
dealing with such public welfare statutes, "the obligation of the
courts is to give them effect so long as they do not violate the
Constitution."24
B. APPLICATION OF THE RCO DOCTRINE mN RCRA CASES
Federal courts have focused a tremendous amount of atten-
tion on the ambiguous mens rea requirement of RCRA's criminal
18. Id. at 281.
19. Id. at 284.
20. 421 U.S. 658 (1975). In Park, the chief executive officer of ACME Mar-
kets, Inc., a major national corporation, challenged his misdemeanor conviction
for adulterating foods under the FDCA. Id. at 666. Specifically, the corporation
had not sufficiently protected a food warehouse from rodent infestation even
after several warnings for similar offenses. Id. at 660. The Court held that the
trial court did not err in instructing the jury that it must find that the defend-
ant "had a responsible relation to the situation," and "by virtue of his position
... had.., authority and responsibility to deal with the situation." Id. at 674
(internal quotes omitted).
21. Id. at 673-74. The trial court instructed the jury that it must find "that
the individual had a responsible relation to the situation even though he may
not have participated personally." Id. at 665 n.9. The Supreme Court also spec-
ified that a defendant may raise a defense of powerlessness or impossibility. Id.
at 673; see also BRIcKEY, supra note 11, § 5:18 (explaining subsequent develop-
ment of "objective impossibility" defense).
22. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
23. Id. at 668 (citing Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81).
24. Id. at 673.
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provisions. 25 In particular, the first two subsections of § 6928(d)
provide for criminal sanctions26 according to mens rea:
[any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous
waste... to a facility which does not have a permit under this sub-
chapter... ; [or]
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste iden-
tified or listed under this subchapter-
(A) without a permit...; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or require-
ment of such permit;
2 7
1. Mens Rea in Each Element of a RCRA Offense
Although the statute employs the term "knowingly,"28
courts have differed as to which elements of the statute "know-
ingly" modifies, asking "how far down the sentence the word...
applies."29 Courts have demonstrated increasing acceptance of
the RCO doctrine in RCRA interpretation by relying on the doc-
trine's underlying policies to resolve these statutory ambigui-
ties. Because Congress enacted RCRA in order to protect the
public health from environmental hazards, courts have con-
ducted statutory analysis differently when examining RCRA
than when examining other types of statutes.
The ambiguity in section one of the statute exists because
the term "knowingly" could apply to any of the following ele-
ments:30 (1) defendant transported waste to a facility;31 (2) the
25. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1852 (1993); United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.
1992); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
26. See supra note 10 (explaining the criminal sanctions).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1988). Part 2 continues: "or (C) in knowing viola-
tion of any material condition or requirement of any interim status regulations
or standards. Id.
28. One commentator has concluded that the mens rea requirement in this
statute is only one of "general intent" rather than "specific intent." Andrea M.
Fike, A Mens Rea Analysis for the Criminal Provisions of the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, 6 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 174, 195, 197 (1986-87) (using the
term "general intent" to connote awareness of acts rather than of illegality).
29. Speach, 968 F.2d at 796. See also Dean, 969 F.2d at 190.
30. One commentator has suggested that the provision divides into the fol-
lowing six elements:
(1) that [defendant is] transporting a material to a facility; (2) that the
material is a hazardous waste; (3) that the facility does not have a per-
mit; (4) that the facility is required to have a permit; (5) that regula-
tions require a permit; and (6) that transporting to a facility without a
permit is unauthorized or illegal.
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waste was hazardous waste;3 2 (3) the facility did not have a per-
mit.3 3 In addition, courts could interpret the statute to require
Rebecca S. Webber, Element Analysis Applied to Environmental Crimes: What
Did They Know and When Did They Know It?, 16 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 53,
84 (1988).
31. Defendant must have "knowingly" transported the waste. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. John-
son & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that "knowingly"
refers at least to "treating, storing or disposing" and "hazardous waste" in
§ 6928(d)(2)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). Similarly, courts have as-
sumed that "knowingly" applies to "transports or causes to be transported" in
§ 6928(d)(1), probably because the adjective very obviously modifies the first
clause. See, e.g., United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1992).
32. In applying "knowingly" to "hazardous waste" the central issue has
been whether a defendant must know that a particular substance is hazardous
as defined by RCRA. Courts have answered in the negative, requiring only that
a defendant know that the material has some potential to be harmful. See, e.g.,
United States v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, 645 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(rejecting notion that defendant had to know chemicals were hazardous accord-
ing to EPA definition); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding it was harmless error to instruct the jury that defendants "had to know
the substances involved were chemicals, without indicating that they also had
to know the chemicals were hazardous"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991);
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding a jury
instruction requiring that "Idefendant knew that the chemical wastes had the
potential to be harmful to others or to the environment, or in other words, it
was not an innocuous substance like water"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990);
United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1452 (11th Cir. 1988) (requiring knowl-
edge that the chemical waste may be harmful to humans or the environment).
Cf United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating there
is no requirement that defendant must know substance is harmful).
33. This provision remains controversial, but the courts of appeals deciding
this issue have held that the defendant must have known that the facility did
not have a permit under section (1). Speach, 968 F.2d at 797 (holding that
while section (2) does not require a showing of knowledge of the permit status,
section (1) does require knowledge as an element of this offense); United States
v. Hayes Int1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that it
would be no defense "to argue ignorance of the permit requirement" under sec-
tion (1), but that the prosecution must nonetheless prove knowledge of the per-
mit status of a facility). The better result is not to require knowledge of the
permit status under section (1) because courts should read this section parallel
to section (2) in order to effectuate its purpose, which is to protect human health
and the environment. See Speach, 968 F.2d at 798 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
Some commentators have treated this issue as one and the same under both
§§ 6928(d)(1) and 6928(d)(2). For example, two commentators have stated gen-
erally that "knowingly" does not modify the permit requirement under
§ 6928(d)(2)(A). Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the
Knowledge Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee,
59 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 862, 878 (1991). See generally Gary S. Lincenberg, Low-
ering Intent Requirements in Environmental Crimes Cases: What You Don't
Know Can Hurt You, 7 CPiM. JusT., Summer 1992, at 28, 30-32 (detailing rele-
vant cases).
1994] 705
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knowledge that transporting hazardous waste to a non-permit-
ted facility is illegal.34
Similarly, the term "knowingly" in section two is ambiguous
because it could apply to the following elements:
(1) defendant treated, stored or disposed of waste;
35
(2) the waste was hazardous;36
(3) defendant did not have a permit or violated a permit require-
ment.
3 7
In reaction to this ambiguity, courts have turned to the poli-
cies of the original RCO doctrine in deciding whether "know-
ingly" modifies RCRA's permit requirement. For example, some
courts have compared RCRA to the FDCA,3s deeming RCRA a
public welfare statute, which Congress enacted to "protect the
national health and environment."3 9 The Ninth Circuit stated,
34. Courts have generally resolved that the defendant did not have to know
that its conduct was illegal. See, e.g., Dean, 969 F.2d at 190 (stating "we see no
basis on the face of the statute for concluding that knowledge of the permit
requirement is an element of the crime") (defendant ordered the construction of
a pit into which drums of hazardous waste were thrown); Dee, 912 F.2d at 745;
Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503-04 (holding that ignorance of permit requirement is no
defense).
The Supreme Court has extensively elaborated on the ignorance of the law
principle in the context of regulation of dangerous materials, holding that
courts may presume knowledge of the law. United States v. International Min-
erals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971). See infra notes 147-150 and
accompanying text (discussing holding and reasoning).
35. See supra note 31.
36. See supra note 32.
37. Two of three circuits addressing this issue have decided that there is no
knowledge requirement regarding the permit status. These courts have relied
in large part upon simple statutory construction, noting the absence of the word
"knowingly" in section (A) as compared with its presence in section (B). United
States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hoflin, 880
F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Had Congress intended knowledge of the
lack of a permit to be an element... it easily could have said so."), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1083 (1990). Interestingly, in Dean, the defendant told investigators
that he thought RCRA "was a bunch of bullshit." 969 F.2d at 190. But see
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984) (stat-
ing that either omission of the word 'knowing' in (A) was inadvertent or...
'nowingly'... which introduces subsection (2) applies to subsection (A)"), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
38. See supra notes 13-15, 23 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Supreme Court created the RCO doctrine in interpreting the FDCA).
39. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (quoting Wyckoff Co. v. E.P.A., 796 F.2d 1197,
1198 (9th Cir. 1986)). Other courts have deemed RCRA a public welfare stat-
ute. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir.
1986) (stating that § 6928 "is undeniably a public welfare statute, involving a
heavily regulated area with great ramifications for the public health and
safety"); Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 668; see also, United States v.
Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the Clean Water
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"There can be little question that RCRA's purposes, like those of
the [FDCA],... touch phases of the lives and health of people
which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely
beyond self-protection."40 Similarly, in deciding that "know-
ingly" does not modify the permit requirement in section two,
the Sixth Circuit has stated that statutes which protect the pub-
lic health and safety are "more likely candidates for diminished
mens rea requirements."41
When analyzing these provisions, courts have found RCRA's
statutory language ambiguous and therefore unhelpful. 42
Courts have also concluded that the legislative history of
RCRA's criminal provisions provides little guidance in interpret-
ing the knowledge requirement.43 In fact, Congress specified
that "it had 'not sought to define "knowing" for offenses under
subsection (d); that process has been left to the courts under
general principles.'"
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988), a similar statute, is also a public welfare
statute). One court has detailed the purpose of RCRA as follows:
The overriding concern of RCRA is the grave danger to people and the
environment from hazardous wastes. Such wastes typically have no
value, yet can only be safely disposed of at considerable cost. Millions
of tons of hazardous substances are literally dumped on the ground
each year; a good many of these can blind, cripple or kill. See 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241 & 6249. Many of such substances are gener-
ated and buried without notice until the damage becomes evident.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038.
40. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 280 (1943)); see also Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503.
41. United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 191-92 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985)).
42. E.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (11th Cir.
1986) ("Congress did not provide any guidance, either in the statute or the legis-
lative history, concerning the meaning of 'knowing' in section 6928(d)."); United
States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that "statutes such
as § 6928(d)(1) are linguistically ambiguous").
43. See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1502.
44. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 5019, 5038).
In deciding that RCRA's criminal provisions cover individual defendants,
however, the Third Circuit described the evolution of RCRA to demonstrate
Congressional intent:
The original statute made knowing disposal (but not treatment or
storage) of such waste without a permit a misdemeanor .... Amend-
ments in 1978 and 1980 expanded the criminal provision to cover
treatment and storage and made violation of section 6928 a felony.
The fact that Congress amended the statute twice to broaden the scope
of its substantive provisions and enhance the penalty is a strong indi-
cation of Congress' increasing concern about the seriousness of the pro-
hibited conduct.
19941
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2. Use of the RCO Doctrine to Prove Knowledge
Although courts have embraced the reasoning of the RCO
doctrine in deciding whether "knowingly" modifies specific
RCRA elements, few courts have directly addressed the extent
to which the RCO doctrine may define "knowingly." Because
RCRA is not a strict liability statute, courts cannot apply the
RCO doctrine to RCRA in the form originally applied to the
FDCA by the Supreme Court.45 The issue is, thus, whether a
court may employ some adaptation of the doctrine to show that a
corporate officer knew about the illegal acts of subordinates. 46
The few courts addressing this issue have disagreed over
whether courts may apply any form of the doctrine.47 On the
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). Congress again strengthened the statute in 1984.
See generally Note, Lessening the Mens Rea Requirement for Hazardous Waste
Violations, 16 VT. L. REV. 419, 423 (1991) (detailing some 1984 changes).
45. See supra notes 15, 23 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Gordon v.
United States, 347 U.S. 909, 910 (1954) (per curiam) (reversing judgment be-
cause "jury was instructed that the knowledge of petitioners' employees was
chargeable to petitioners in determining petitioners' wilfulness); see also Bar-
rett & Clarke, supra notes 33, 152, at 883 (stating that the government may not
use the doctrine "as a strict liability theory of vicarious culpability"). Addition-
ally, the original doctrine is different because it only applied to misdemeanor
violations involving small fines and limited prison sentences. The FDCA could
impose a maximum of one year in prison and $1,000. United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658, 666 n.10 (1975). A RCRA criminal offense is much more severe. See
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
46. Generally, courts determine that a person acts "knowingly" when "he
[sic] is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause [a certain]
result." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This
is the most widely accepted definition of "knowingly." LAFAVE & ScoTr, CRIMI-
NAL LAw § 3.5(b), at 218 (2d ed. 1986). Definitions, however, abound:
Cases have held that one has knowledge of a given fact when he has
the means for obtaining such knowledge, when he has notice of facts
which would put one on inquiry as to the existence of the fact, when he
has information sufficient to generate a reasonable belief as to that
fact, or when the circumstances are such that a reasonable man [sic]
would believe that such a fact existed.
LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra, § 3.5(b), at 220 (citations omitted). One commentator
has stated, "[wihat constitutes 'knowledge' under RCRA for purposes of crimi-
nal liability is probably the most confusing aspect of the Act. The definition of
'knowledge' changes dramatically depending upon how the issue is approached
and who makes the interpretation." G. Nelson Smith III, No Longer Just a Cost
of Doing Business: Criminal Liability of Corporate Officials for Violations of the
Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 53 LA. L.
REv. 119, 141 (1992).
47. Commentators have also reached conflicting results. Compare Hart-
man & De Monaco, supra note 8, at 10151 (stating that the doctrine has no
relation to knowledge requirement, but rather only applies to definition of "per-
son" in statute) with Barrett & Clarke, supra note 33, at 888 (concluding that
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one hand, the Third Circuit stated that knowledge of all the ele-
ments of a RCRA offense "may be inferred by the jury as to those
individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions with the
corporate defendant."48 Similarly, in the context of the Clean
Water Act 49, the Tenth Circuit seemingly embraced the RCO
doctrine in stating in dicta that the requisite willfulness or neg-
ligence of a corporate officer defendant "would be imputed to
him by virtue of his position of responsibility."50 These courts
leave open, however, the question of exactly how courts should
apply the doctrine.
Furthermore, some non-environmental cases allow the jury
to draw strong inferences of knowledge based on a defendant's
position, without specifically addressing the RCO doctrine.5 1
For example, the Second Circuit held that a jury could infer
knowledge of false advertising claims to the president of a com-
pany even though the prosecution did not prove that he directed
the false claims himself.52
some version of the doctrine "properly holds those officers criminally liable who
have the ultimate responsibility for, and the power to protect, the public health
and the environment").
48. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 670 (dictum),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). In this case, the corporation pumped hazard-
ous chemicals, such as methylene chloride and trichlorethylene, into a trench
which flowed into a tributary of the Delaware River. Id. at 664. The court also
stated, "our conclusion that knowingly' applies to all elements of the offense in
section 6298(d)(2)(A) does not impose on the government as difficult a burden
as it fears." Id. at 669. Similarly, in United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., the
Third Circuit upheld a responsible corporate officer doctrine instruction based
on Park and Dotterweich in order to show a mens rea level of willfully or negli-
gently under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c). 602 F.2d
1123, 1130 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979); See Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 8, at
10149 n.51 (reproducing the original Frezzo instruction). But see Zarky, supra
note 8 at 990 (stating that defendants in Frezzo Bros. never actually challenged
the RCO instruction in that case).
49. This case involved the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
(Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c)(1) (1988).
50. United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1546 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d
423, 430 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
52. Andreadis, 366 F.2d at 430. The fraudulent claims in this case in-
volved "Regimen Tablets," a sort of "miracle weight reducing drug." Id. at 426-
27. The advertising scheme involved newspaper, magazine, radio and televi-
sion, and included "sponsors," who would claim to have lost a substantial
amount of weight. Id. at 427. Rather, the jury could infer that his agent, who
had knowledge of the false claims, conveyed the information to him. Id. at 430
(citing United States v. Press, 336 F.2d 1003, 1009 (2d Cir. 1964); United States
v. Lichota, 351 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966)).
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On the other hand, in United States v. White, a federal dis-
trict court rejected a modern version of the doctrine because it
"would allow a conviction without showing the requisite in-
tent."53 In White, the prosecution unsuccessfully attempted to
adapt the doctrine in the Bill of Particulars as follows:
As the responsible corporate officer for environmental safety of
PureGro, the defendant Steven Steed had direct responsibility to su-
pervise the handling of hazardous waste by PureGro employees. He is
liable for the acts of all other agents and employees of PureGro in han-
dling the hazardous waste at PureGro facilities which he knew of or
should have known of.5 4
The court equated this statement of the RCO doctrine with the
original doctrine, stating that the Supreme Court developed it in
the context of statutes that involve strict liability and require
neither mens rea nor actus reus.55 There is, therefore, no con-
sensus among jurisdictions as to whether courts may employ
some form of the RCO doctrine to define RCRA's "knowingly"
requirement.
3. Implementation of the Doctrine Through Jury Instructions
Courts may apply the RCO doctrine in the form of a jury
instruction,56 the mechanism which guides the jury in imple-
In the alternative, the court held that the president had an affirmative
duty to insure that the company's claims were true, and "having failed totally to
discharge this responsibility in even the slightest measure, [he] should not be
permitted to escape the consequences of his inattention." Id. at 430 (footnote
omitted).
Another federal case has held that a jury may infer that a vessel's crew
member has knowledge of illegal drugs if"it would be unreasonable for anyone
other than a knowledgeable participant to be present." Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d
at 1546. In this case, the Coast Guard boarded the vessel and found 220 bales
of marijuana in the hold. Id. at 1544. The defendant claimed that he was an
unknowing passenger on board. To convict the defendant of conspiracy to pos-
sess and intent to distribute marijuana, the government had to prove "the exist-
ence of a conspiracy, [defendant's] knowing participation in it and [defendant's]
criminal intent." Id.
53. United States v. White, 766 F.Supp. 873, 895 (E.D. Wash. 1991). The
court concluded that this theory would allow conviction "under a state of mind
requirement other than that specified by Congress." Id. Moreover, the court
stated, without elaborating, that the RCO doctrine in Johnson & Towers was
"clearly dicta." Id. In White, the defendants allegedly loaded hazardous waste
materials, Telone I, into a truck and sprayed the material onto a field, thereby
violating RCRA's criminal provisions. Id. at 877.
54. Id. at 894.
55. Id. at 894-95.
56. At the close of trial, the judge instructs the jury as to the legal stan-
dards it must apply regarding each element that the prosecution must prove.
Geoffrey Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury
Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Pro-
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menting the law.57 Courts thus commonly instruct juries re-
garding judicial doctrines to define the term "kmowingly".58 For
example, in United States v. Dee, one district court gave the fol-
lowing instructions to the jury:
[You shall return a guilty verdict] if you find that the government has
proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that each defendant has a responsible relationship to the
violation. That is, that it occurred under his area of authority and su-
pervisory responsibility.
That each defendant had the power or the capacity to prevent the
violation. That each defendant acted knowingly in failing to prevent,
detect or correct the violation. And I have told you what you can con-
sider on the question of knowingly.5 9
ject, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 401, 402 (1990) (concluding that jurors often do not
understand jury instructions). Clear and accurate instructions are essential be-
cause the closed room jury system provides for few safeguards on the jurors'
comprehension. Id. at 403; see also Zarky, supra note 8, at 985 ("Since the pre-
cise wording of the instructions tells the jury how to apply the facts to the law,
that language can make all the difference between a guilty verdict and an
acquittal.").
57. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 672, 675 (1975) (upholding a jury in-
struction implementing the original RCO doctrine) (stating that the purpose of
a jury instruction is generally to provide "an adequate statement of the law to
guide the jury's determination"). But see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN
CR mNAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS xiv (1991 ed. 1987) [hereinafter MODERN FEDERAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (stating, "[i]t is all too easy for the lawyers and judges who
engage in the drafting process to forget how much of their vocabulary and lan-
guage style was acquired in law school").
58. The jury instruction regarding the term "knowingly" widely varies by
circuit. For example, the Ninth Circuit typically states:
An act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and does
not act (or fail to act) through ignorance, mistake or accident. The gov-
ernment is not required to prove that the defendant knew that his/her
acts or omissions were unlawful. You may consider the evidence of the
defendant's words, acts, or omissions, along with all the other evi-
dence, in deciding whether the defendant acted knowingly.
MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 57, § 9-46. Similarly, the
Fifth Circuit model instruction states that "kowingly... means that the act
was done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or accident." Id.
§ 5-29. In striking contrast, the Sixth Circuit provides no model instruction be-
cause it has determined that "the meaning of the term 'knowingly' varies de-
pending on the particular statute in which it appears." Id. § 6-42. The Eighth
Circuit provides no model instruction, because "in most cases the word 'know-
ingly' does not need to be defined." Id. § 8-223 (citing United States v. Smith,
635 F.2d 716, 719-20 (8th Cir. 1980).
59. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 33, at 885 (citing Supplemental Appendix
for Brief for Appellee at 521-524 in United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.
1990)). Commentators examining this application of the RCO doctrine have
reached opposite conclusions. Compare Zarky, supra note 8, at 993 (stating
that these instructions eliminate knowledge requirement in favor of a "know-
ingly fail to know" requirement) with Barrett & Clarke, supra note 33, at 885
1994]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Similarly, courts commonly apply the "willful blindness"
doctrine in the form of a jury instruction in order to prove a de-
fendant's knowledge of a particular act. For example, one court
stated "you may find that the defendant acted knowingly if you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of
a high probability [of the illegal act] and... deliberately avoided
learning the truth."60
In reviewing the jury instruction, appellate courts must de-
termine whether an instruction has relieved the prosecution of
its burden of persuasion 61 by demanding that the jury reach a
(stating "[ilt is clear that the above instructions did not replace the knowledge
requirement under RCRA"). The court further instructed the jury;
Among the circumstances you may consider in determining the defend-
ant's [sic] knowledge are their positions in the organization, including
their responsibilities under the regulations and under applicable poli-
cies. Thus you may, but need not, infer that a defendant knew facts
which you find that they should have known given their positions in
the organization, their relationship to other employees, or any applica-
ble policies or regulation. Again, this is only one factor which you may
consider in determining whether the government has established
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt .... You should consider the
defendant's behavior in light of all the circumstances and instructions
which I am giving you in determining whether the government has es-
tablished beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants acted
knowingly.
Barrett & Clarke, supra note 33, at 885 (citing Supplemental Appendix for Brief
for Appellee at 521-524 United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990)).
Although the instructions in this case were never challenged, the Dee court
noted, "As a whole, the instructions 'fairly and adequately state[d] the pertinent
legal principles involved.'" 912 F.2d at 746 n.8 (quoting Hogg's Oyster Co. v.
United States, 676 F.2d 1015, 1019 (4th Cir. 1982)).
60. MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 57, at 8-224. Simi-
larly, one author suggests, "[tlhe element of knowledge may be satisfied by in-
ferences drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what
would otherwise have been obvious to him." HoN. EDWARD J. DEvrrr &
CHARLES B. BLAcKmAn, 1 FEDERAL JURY PaACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.09
(3d ed. 1977). Many circuits have adopted a "willful blindness" or "deliberate
ignorance" instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Bobadille-Lopez, 954 F.2d
519, 523 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 698-99
(9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976)), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 987 (1993); United States v. Miller, 962 F.2d 739, 745 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Kershman, 555 F.2d 198, 201 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 892 (1977). See generally Hansen, supra note 8, at 990-95.
61. The Constitution requires the prosecution to bear the burden of persua-
sion in a criminal case. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 518, 520-24
(1979) (striking down an instruction stating that "the law presumes that a per-
son intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts"); County Court of
Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 161-162, n.22 (1979). Similarly, the court
must safeguard a defendant's presumption of innocence and the factfinding role
of the jury. Id. See generally KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCOM MCK ON EvI-
DENCE, § 349, at 599 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCoR-
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particular conclusion. 62 In legal terminology, the reviewing
court asks whether an instruction forms a conclusive presump-
tion or a permissive inference. 63 In a conclusive presumption
instruction, the judge tells the jury that it must find the pre-
sumed element once convinced of specified basic facts.6 4 Appel-
late courts rarely uphold such presumptions in criminal cases.65
In a permissive inference instruction, however, the judge in-
structs the jury that it may find the presumed element based on
specified underlying facts, but that it is not required to do S0.66
MICK ON EVIDENCE] (stating "the trial judge must use caution in charging the
jury so as to place no burden whatsoever on the defendant").
62. On review, the court will ask "what a reasonable juror could have un-
derstood the charge as meaning." Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 376 (1988)
(citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516-17).
63. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 140 (1979) (seminal case distinguishing between
the two kinds of presumptions); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d
1499, 1504 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that "an inference is a conclusion which
the lawpermits the jury to draw if it finds a given set of facts; a presumption, on
the other hand, is a conclusion which the law directs the jury to draw from the
facts"). Generally, a presumption is "a standardized practice, under which cer-
tain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as
proof of other facts." McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 61, § 342, at 578.
See generally Stephen Saltzburg, Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases:
Harmonizing the View of the Justices, 20 AM. CmM. L. REV. 393, 412-421 (1983);
Annotation, Modern Statutory Instructions Allowing Presumption or Inference
of Guilt from Possession of Recently Stolen Property as Defendant's Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 88 A.L.R.3d 1178 (1978) (explaining that instruc-
tions on presumptions or inferences of guilt regarding stolen property generally
withstand constitutional attack that alleges violation of privilege against self-
incrimination).
64. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 517-19; Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
65. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 (stating that mandatory presumptions are
unconstitutional where the underlying facts alone do not support an inference
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978) (stating "the jury must remain free to consider addi-
tional evidence before accepting or rejecting the inference").
66. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 61, § 348, at 599 (emphasis ad-
ded). In Allen, the court upheld a New York statutory presumption that pres-
ence of a firearm in an automobile created a presumption that every person in
the automobile illegally possessed the firearm. Allen, 442 U.S. at 142. In the
Allen instruction, the court stated, "The presumption or presumptions which I
discussed with the jury relative to the drugs or weapons in this case need not be
rebutted by affirmative proof or affirmative evidence but may be rebutted by
any evidence or lack of evidence in the case." Id. at 161 n.20. One commentator
stated, "[t~he government may not evade its responsibility to prove guilt of the
offense it charges by relying on a judicial comment that goes beyond a fair as-
sessment of the proof actually presented." Saltzburg, supra note 63, at 419.
In Barnes v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld a common law pre-
sumption when the trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
Possession ofrecently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is
ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the
1994]
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A permissive inference is constitutional as long as the inference
is not irrational.67
II. UNITED STATES V. MACDONALD & WATSON WASTE
OIL CO.
In MacDonald & Watson,68 the First Circuit held that proof
that the defendant was a corporate officer with both control over
the illegal transportation and knowledge of similar violations
was insufficient to establish knowledge under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d)(1). 69 The jury convicted Eugene K. D'Allesandro, the
inference and find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by
the evidence il the case, that the person in possession knew the prop-
erty had been stolen. However, you are never required to make this
inference.
412 U.S. 837, 840 n.3, 845-46 (1973). See also Saltzburg, supra note 63, at 419
(stating, "[a]s long as an inference is rational and the judge does not indicate
anything other than the permissibility of drawing the inference, a reviewing
court is very unlikely to find fault with the trial judge.").
67. The Supreme Court recently stated its analysis of the presumption.
A mandatory presumption, even though rebuttable, is different from a
permissive presumption, which "does not require... the trier of fact to
infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one
and... places no burden on the defendant." A permissive presumption
merely allows an inference to be drawn and is constitutional so long as
the inference would not be irrational.
Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1892 n.7 (1991) (holding jury instructions un-
constitutional as conclusive presumption and quoting County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979)) (citations omitted), overruled by Es-
telle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 n.4 (1991) (discussing standard of review of
jury instructions); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446
(1978) (rejecting a conclusive presumption and stating that the instruction at
issue would have been upheld had it been in the form of a permissive inference).
68. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
69. Id. at 55. The court stated that "[i]n a crime having knowledge as an
express element, a mere showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich
and Park is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of
knowledge." Id.
In addition, the court addressed in dicta the question of knowledge of a
facility's permit status under § 6928(d)(1). Id. at 47. Specifically, the court
questioned "whether 'knowingly' in subsection (d)(1) not only requires knowl-
edge as to the nature of the hazardous waste being transported, but also knowl-
edge of the facility's permit status, i.e. that the facility lacked a proper permit."
Id. While declining to decide the issue, the First Circuit stated that it agreed
"[als an initial matter" with the lower court's determination that such knowl-
edge is an essential element of the offense. The court stated "obviously, if a
conviction under subsection (d)(1) requires that a defendant know, or be will-
fully indifferent to, the facility's lack of a proper permit, this would eliminate
the danger of convicting some hypothetical transporter who lacked information
that the disposal facility was without the proper license." Id. at 48.
Although this dicta played a minor role in this opinion, such a sweeping
statement has major implications in light of a recent case in which the Ninth
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president and general manager of MacDonald & Watson Oil Co.,
of illegal transportation of hazardous waste to a facility without
a permit.70 Specifically, MacDonald & Watson, a subcontractor,
operated a facility under a RCRA permit that authorized the dis-
posal of liquid hazardous waste, but not solid hazardous
waste.71 Nonetheless, the facility accepted toluene-contami-
nated soil, a solid hazardous waste. 72
The prosecution conceded in its closing argument that it
had "no direct evidence that [the defendant]... actually knew"
of the hazardous waste shipment.73 The government argued,
however, that D'Allesandro violated the permit requirement be-
cause "he was in a position to ensure compliance with RCRA and
had failed to do so even after being warned by a consultant on
two earlier occasions" of similar illegal shipments. 74 The trial
court instructed the jury that it could either find "actual knowl-
edge of the act in question" or that the defendant was an RCO. 75
The court then gave a three-part instruction defining the term
"RCO":
First, it must be shown that the person is an officer of the corpora-
tion, not merely an employee.
Second, it must be shown that the officer had direct responsibility
for the activities that are alleged to be illegal. Simply being an officer
or even the president of a corporation is not enough. The Government
must prove that the person had a responsibility to supervise the activi-
ties in question.
And the third requirement is that the officer must have known or
believed that the illegal activity of the type alleged occurred.
7 6
The First Circuit held that this instruction erroneously al-
lowed the jury to find guilt without finding actual knowledge as
specified in the statute.77 The court focused on the third part of
Circuit reached the same result. United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the prosecution must prove knowledge of the
permit status of a facility under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1)). See supra note 37
and accompanying text (explaining the controversy surrounding this
interpretation).
70. 933 F.2d at 39.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 40.
73. Id. at 50.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 50-51.
77. Id. at 51. The court stated, however, that the prosecution may use cir-
cumstantial evidence to establish knowledge. "We agree with the decisions dis-
cussed above that knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,
including position and responsibility of defendants such as corporate officers, as
well as information provided to those defendants on prior occasions." Id. at 55.
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the instruction, interpreting it to mean that the jury need only
find that the defendant must have known that similar illegal
shipments "had previously occurred," 78 rather than actual
knowledge of the shipments at issue. The court reasoned that
although Dotterweich79 and Parks° "reflect what is now clear
and well-established law in respect to public welfare statutes
and regulations lacking an express knowledge . . . require-
ment,"8 ' the original RCO doctrine as articulated in those cases
does not apply to statutes that require knowledge.8 2 In addi-
tion, the court distinguished Park and Dotterweich because
those cases involved misdemeanors, while a violation of RCRA
constitutes a felony carrying more serious consequences.83 The
court labeled the jury instruction as a "conclusive, or
'mandatory' presumption of knowledge of the facts constituting
the offense,"84 for which no precedent exists.85
78. Id. at 51.
79. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
81. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 51-52.
82. Id. at 55.
83. The First Circuit stated that application of the doctrine is especially
inappropriate "where, as here, the crime is a felony carrying possible imprison-
ment of five years and, for a second offense, ten." Id. at 52.
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. at 52 ("Wle know of no precedent for failing to give effect to a
knowledge requirement that Congress has expressly included in a criminal
statute."). The court cited several cases for the proposition that there is no pre-
cedent supporting a "mandatory" presumption of knowledge. Id. at 53 (citing
Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (per curiam); Francis v. Franklin, 471
U.S. 307, 314 (1985); Hill v. Maloney, 927 F.2d 646, 648, 649 n.3 (1st Cir.
1990)). The court distinguished United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741
F.2d 662, 670 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985), claiming it al-
lowed only an inference of knowledge regarding the law and not regarding
knowledge of facts. 933 F.2d at 53-54. See supra note 48 (explaining the John-
son & Towers holding). The court also stated that United States v. Dee, 912
F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991), stands only
for the proposition that "knowledge of RCRA's prohibitions may be presumed."
933 F.2d at 53.
The court also distinguished three Supreme Court denials of certiorari that
the prosecution relied upon in support of similar jury instructions. First, the
court distinguished United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980), because it involved only willful-
ness or negligence rather than knowledge. 933 F.2d at 54. In addition, the
court distinguished United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 232
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986), because the RCO jury instruction
only involved the portion of the offense that did not require intent. 933 F.2d at
54. In Cattle King Packing, the court told the jury that it must nonetheless find
intent for all of the other counts. Id. (citing Cattle King Packing, 793 F.2d at
241). Finally, the court distinguished United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967), because that case only permit-
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III. THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF THE RCO
DOCTRINE
Case law prior to MacDonald & Watson demonstrated a
growing trend among the federal courts of appeals to apply some
form of the RCO Doctrine when interpreting RCRA's criminal
provisions.8 6 Despite some commentators' admonitions,8 7 how-
ever, these courts have not specifically held that the original
strict liability version of the RCO doctrine may establish defend-
ant's knowledge of the actual offense.88 Although courts have
suggested such an application of the doctrine,8 9 no court of ap-
peals had directly confronted this issue prior to MacDonald &
Watson so that the time was ripe for the First Circuit to imple-
ment the doctrine with full force. Nevertheless, the court re-
fused to allow the doctrine to eviscerate the "knowingly"
ted an inference of willful blindness based on circumstantial evidence. 933 F.2d
at 54. The court concluded that these three cases stand only for the proposition
that "knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including posi-
tion and responsibility of defendants such as corporate officers, as well as infor-
mation provided to those defendants on prior occasions." Id. at 55.
86. Courts and commentators have embraced the RCO doctrine in inter-
preting various provisions of the statute. See supra notes 39-42 and accompa-
nying text; see also Barrett & Clarke, supra note 33, at 881-88 (discussing how
RCO doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on corporate officers); Robert I. Mc-
Murry & Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L-A. L. REv. 1133, 1153
(1986) (discussing use of RCO doctrine in criminal enforcement actions); Pat-
rick 0. Cavanaugh, Pursuit of the "Responsible Corporate Officer" for Environ-
mental Violations: The First Circuit Throws a Curve, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Winter 1992, at 40, 41 (discussing development of RCO doctrine).
87. See Cavanaugh, supra note 86, at 40 (stating that application of the
doctrine signifies that "lack of actual knowledge on the part of the defendant
will not necessarily preclude a finding of criminal liability."); Hansen, supra
note 8, at 1004-11 (arguing that the courts in both Johnson & Towers and
Hayes misapplied the doctrine); McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 86, at 1153
(stating, "[aictual knowledge of the act is not required"); Morgan & Obermann,
supra note 8, at 1219 (arguing that increased prosecution discourages disclo-
sure); Keith Onsdorff & James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine in RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You,
22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10099, 10100 (1992) (arguing that federal
prosecutors are too aggressive in enforcing RCRA's criminal provisions); Zarky,
supra note 8, at 984 (stating, "It]he doctrine could render corporate officers
guilty of felonies... even if they had no knowledge of the problem and acted
responsibly in attempting to keep the corporation in compliance with the law.").
But see Ronald M. Broudy, Note, RCRA and the Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine: Getting Tough on Corporate Offenders by Sidestepping the Mens Rea
Requirement, 80 KY. L.J. 1055, 1065-69 (1991-92) (distinguishing between
knowledge of the permit requirement and act of disposing).
88. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (explaining that one court
has specifically rejected direct application).
89. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
19941 717
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
requirement, and therefore began to establish the outer bounda-
ries of the RCO doctrine with respect to "knowing" environmen-
tal crimes.
A. THE COURT CoRREcTLY DECIDED ACDOVALD & WATSON
Statutory interpretation and analysis of the RCO doctrine
indicate that the court's holding was technically correct. Unlike
the permit requirement clause, which trails at the end of the
sentence, the clause requiring that a defendant know of the ille-
gal acts which constitute an offense is unambiguous. 90 At the
very least, the prosecution must prove that the defendant
"knowingly" transported, or caused the transportation of, the
hazardous waste.91 The issue no longer concerns which words
"knowingly" modifies, but rather how the prosecution may prove
the knowledge itself.92
Unfortunately, the statute provides no definition of the
term "knowingly."93 The legislative history seemingly provides
equally sparse guidance in leaving the definition to the "general
principles of the courts."94 The history only helps in that it sug-
gests that a court employ some form of the doctrine, as long as it
serves to define "knowingly." Courts cannot apply the RCO doc-
trine to RCRA in the same manner in which the Supreme Court
applied it to the FDCA.95 That statute did not specify any mens
90. See supra text accompanying note 30.
91. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining that "knowingly"
clearly applies to the first clause of § 6928(d)(1)).
92. See supra note 46 (explaining many definitions of "knowingly"); supra
note 58 (explaining various jury instructions on "knowingly").
93. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1988) (giving no definition for "knowingly")
with 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f) (1988) (providing a special definition for the term
"knowing" for a "knowing endangerment" violation).
94. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Had Congress wished a
more specific definition, it certainly could have defined "knowingly" itself,
rather than leave the interpretation to the courts. This is especially true in
light of the ongoing controversy over the application of the RCO doctrine. Com-
pare Hansen, supra note 8, at 1023 (arguing that the RCO doctrine has no ap-
plication to "knowing" environmental crimes) with Barrett & Clarke, supra note
33, at 888 (arguing for continued application of the doctrine to "knowing" envi-
ronmental crimes).
Moreover, Congress has shown its awareness of the doctrine by including
express language regarding responsible corporate officers in other statutes.
See, e.g., The Clean Water Act, § 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (1988) ("For
the purpose of this subsection, the term 'person' means ... any responsible
corporate officer."); The Clean Air Act, § 113(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (1988)
("For the purpose of this subsection, the term'person' includes.. . any responsi-
ble corporate officer.").
95. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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rea requirement and thus, the Court focused on whether it
would be necessary to read a mens rea requirement into the
statute. 96 In MacDonald & Watson, the issue was whether the
trial court effectively read the mens rea requirement out of the
statute. 97
The MacDonald & Watson court correctly focused on the
trial court's expression of the RCO doctrine in the form of the
three-part jury instruction.9 8 The third part of this instruction,
allowing for a showing of knowledge of illegal activity "of the
type alleged,"99 did not require the jury to find that defendant
knew of the specifically charged illegal activity.100 Rather, the
jury's belief that defendant knew of any similar illegal activity
would mandate a finding of knowledge, creating guilt by associa-
tion. The trial court therefore effectively eliminated the mens
rea requirement as to all elements of the statute.
Essential to the First Circuit's holding was that the instruc-
tion included no words of discretion and thus constituted a
"mandatory presumption".' 0 ' The district court stated, "In or-
der to prove that a person is a responsible corporate officer three
things must be shown,"102 making no suggestion that the jury
could find the three elements without finding the defendant's ac-
tual knowledge. This mandatory presumption did not support
an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and thus uncon-
stitutionally relieved the prosecutor of the burden of
persuasion.'0 3
Although the court correctly determined that the jury in-
struction was erroneous, 0 4 it took the additional step of declar-
96. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
98. See supra text accompanying note 76.
99. See supra text accompanying note 76.
100. See supra text accompanying note 76.
101. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 53. See supra notes 63-69 (explaining "conclusive" or "man-
datory" presumptions).
103. See supra notes 63, 67, and accompanying text (explaining that in a
mandatory presumption, underlying facts must support an inference of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt).
104. The court correctly reasoned that there is no precedent for such an in-
struction employing a conclusive presumption. See supra note 85 and accompa-
nying text. But see United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir.
1991) (stating in dicta that under the Clean Water Act, "the willfulness or negli-
gence of the actor would be imputed to him by virtue of his position of responsi-
bility.") Brittain differs from MacDonald & Watson because the Clean Water
Act explicitly includes the term "responsible corporate officer." See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(3) (1988). Previous RCRA cases have primarily focused on which
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ing the error grounds for reversal. 10 5 Such a conclusion is
significant because the evidence against D'Allesandro seems to
have been strong enough to hold the error harmless: 0 6 He was a
"'hands-on' manager of [a] relatively small firm;"1° 7 his subordi-
nates had contracted for and transported the hazardous
waste;_08 and he had been warned on two previous occasions
that the facility in question had received other shipments of tol-
terms "knowingly" modified and not whether a court can read "knowingly" out
of the statute. See supra notes 29-30. The MacDonald & Watson court focused
on: United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dee,
912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991); and United
States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985). MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 53. Similarly, the court
distinguished United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402
U.S. 558 (1971), because it specifically addressed whether the prosecution had
to prove that defendant knew of regulations. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d
at 53. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text (explaining the holding of
International Minerals). Additional cases support this distinction. See, e.g.,
Dee, 912 F.2d at 745 (defendants claimed only that they knew neither that vio-
lation of RCRA was a crime nor that the chemicals they managed were hazard-
ous waste); see also United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 190-92 (6th Cir. 1992)
(defendant criminally liable despite not knowing of RCRA's permit require-
ment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1852 (1993); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d
1033, 1036-39 (9th Cir. 1989) (defendant who participated in unauthorized dis-
posal guilty regardless of knowledge about permit), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083
(1990).
105. See MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 50; see also Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 313-24 (1979) (stating that a reviewing court should uphold a jury
verdict where the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable person to find the de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). The Supreme Court has stated, "[a]
single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be
viewed in the context of the overall charge." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,
146-47 (1973) (citing Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107 (1926)).
106. See Morgan & Obermann, supra note 8, at 1208 (arguing that there
was sufficient evidence "to satisfy the knowledge threshold via circumstantial
evidence"); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct 475, 482 n.4 (1992) (discussing
standard of review for jury instructions); United States v. Loriano, 984 F.2d
1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing harmless error standard).
107. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 50. The closer a manager is to the
work, the greater the inference is of knowledge of occurrences in the business.
In the development of the RCO doctrine, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,
674 (1975), made it clear that the new RCO doctrine applies to high-level of-
ficers. See supra note 20 (explaining that the defendant was the chief execu-
tive officer of a major national corporation). This application implicitly
extended the doctrine from United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278
(1943), where the defendant was the president and general manager of the Buf-
falo Pharmacal Company, Inc., a much smaller company. The Dotterweich
Court refused to define the class of employees who stand in responsible relation
to the offense. Id. at 285. The Court stated, "In such matters the good sense of
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of
juries must be trusted." Id.
108. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 50.
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uene-contaminated material in violation of its permit. 0 9 More-
over, the court acknowledged that the jury instruction itself
"could be read to require actual knowledge" of the shipments." 0
The First Circuit seems, therefore, to have sought a bright line
to stop the perceived expansion of the RCO doctrine."' Given
the likelihood that other courts would have similarly used the
doctrine to replace the "knowingly" requirement and therefore
legislate in place of Congress," z2 the First Circuit correctly
sounded the alarm against such erroneous application. Con-
trary to the conclusion of recent commentators, 113 however, the
court should not have ruled out application of the doctrine in its
entirety. 14
109. Id.
110. Id. at 51.
111. Two commentators suggest that the MacDonald & Watson court "ap-
parently wished to send an unequivocal message that proof that a defendant is
a responsible corporate officer will not suffice to conclusively establish the ele-
ment of knowledge expressly required under environmental statutes." Morgan
& Obermann, supra note 8, at 1209. The better explanation is that such proof
did not suffice under the RCO doctrine as stated by the MacDonald & Watson
trial court.
112. Had Congress intended a strict liability statute, it would not have in-
cluded the word "knowingly" in the statute. See, e.g., the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988) (a strict liability statute).
113. One commentator, agreeing that the doctrine did not apply in MacDon-
ald & Watson, seems to see no further application of the doctrine and argues
that the RCO doctrine should not apply at all to show knowledge of illegal acts.
Broudy, supra note 87, at 1073. Similarly, other commentators argue that the
doctrine only defines the term "person" in environmental statutes, but does not
address the mens rea of the statute. See Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 8,
at 10151. This statement is incorrect. Although the issue in Dotterweich re-
garded the definition of person, see supra note 17, the fundamental focus of
Park, the seminal RCO case, was the mens rea of the defendant. United States
v. Park, 421 U.S. 668, 670-73 (1975). See Zarky, supra note 8, at 986. In Park,
the Court held, "We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that it was incum-
bent upon the District Court to instruct the jury that the Government had the
burden of establishing 'wrongful action' .... " 421 U.S. at 673. The Court pro-
ceeded to detail the prima facie case against a corporate officer, id. at 673-74,
which would have been wholly unnecessary had the doctrine applied only to
defining "person." Since Park, the courts' special treatment of public welfare
statutes and widespread acceptance of the RCO doctrine suggest that the doc-
trine should not be ignored in "knowing" crimes. See also Lincenberg, supra
note 33, at 28-30 (arguing the RCO doctrine should apply only to misdemeanor
offenses).
114. It is arguable that the First Circuit did not reject application of the
RCO doctrine to knowing crimes, but rather rejected a particular adaptation of
the doctrine. The court did not state that the doctrine can never apply, but only
that the particular instruction evaded the knowledge requirement. MacDonald
& Watson, 933 F.2d at 51.
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B. IMPLEMENTING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT THROUGH THE RCO
DOCTRINE
Courts should still make use of some form of the RCO doc-
trine in order to implement congressional intent in RCRA crimi-
nal cases. Faced with an ambiguous mens rea requirement in a
statute designed to protect the public health, the Supreme Court
originally developed the RCO doctrine to allow the conviction of
corporate officers despite absence of wrongdoing.'1 5  The
Supreme Court stated in Park that Congress has "seen fit to en-
force the accountability of responsible corporate agents dealing
with products which may affect the health of consumers by pe-
nal sanctions cast in rigorous terms, and the obligation of the
courts is to give them effect so long as they do not violate the
Constitution."116
One half century later, Congress similarly enacted RCRA in
order to protect the public health"L7 and again included an am-
biguous mens rea requirement.: L8 Once again, prosecutors face
the corporate officer problem:
Although it is often relatively easy to assign knowledge and blame to
the low-level employee who dumped or buried hazardous waste, or to
prove that a shift foreman or plant manager personally directed the
employee's actions, it is much more difficult to climb up the corporate
ladder and prove that a corporate executive had knowledge of a RCRA
violation.... When the environmental violations are the result of cor-
porate decisionmaking or policy, however, prosecution of only low-level
employees is not only unfair but also fails to serve the deterrent func-
tion that is the goal of environmental enforcement. 1 19
One simple and logical means of providing definition in the face
of this ambiguity is to adapt theRCO doctrine to incorporate the
knowledge requirement, 120 protect the public health, and safe-
guard defendants' rights.
115. See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
116. 421 U.S. at 673.
117. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., supra note 46 (explaining many definitions of "knowingly");
supra note 58 (explaining various jury instructions on "knowingly").
119. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 33, at 883.
120. Although commentators routinely argue that the doctrine does not ap-
ply to the definition of "knowledge," e.g., Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 8,
at 10151, the better result is to modify it to the needs of the statute, and to the
public health and welfare. But see Alexandra Varney, Comment, Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine Does Not Satisfy Required Element of Knowledge
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-United States v. MacDon-
ald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991), 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
895, 900 (1992) (concluding that courts should strike a balance between RCRA's
purpose and the knowledge requirement).
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Continued application of the RCO doctrine is consistent
with congressional intent precisely because Congress specifi-
cally left the definition of "knowingly" to the courts. 121 Although
some courts consider this statement unhelpful,'122 it nonetheless
gives courts license to consider doctrinal interpretations, such as
the RCO doctrine, in their analysis. By not defining "know-
ingly," Congress recognized that the definition is not static, but
rather changes according to modern jurisprudence and congres-
sional guidance. 23
Moreover, Congress has amended RCRA's criminal provi-
sions three times, making sanctions for environmental viola-
tions more severe with each change.' 24 Congress has therefore
signalled its concern regarding the seriousness of RCRA viola-
tions. 125 RCRA itself specifies that Congress intended to pro-
mote more careful management of planning of hazardous waste
disposal and to place adequate controls on hazardous waste
management. 12 6 Allowing a court to provide guidance to juries
in complex RCRA cases through the use of the RCO doctrine
supports this legislative intent by facilitating appropriate crimi-
nal convictions of corporate officers and working as a deterrent
to those who can act to protect the environment from RCRA vio-
lations. 127 In other words, corporate officers will necessarily
take more care in the management of hazardous waste to ensure
that their subordinates are not engaged in felony activity.
121. See supra text accompanying note 46; see also United States v. Duruss,
393 U.S. 297, 310 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(stating, "Our task is to decide what jury instruction with respect to the defini-
tion of 'purpose' comports best with Congress' [sic] intent as revealed by this
statutory language and the underlying legislative history.").
122. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 46 (explaining many definitions of "knowingly"); supra
note 58 (explaining jury instructions on "knowingly"); see also infra notes 137-
150 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court cases treating the term).
124. See supra note 46.
125. See supra note 46.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2), (b)(5) (1988).
127. See STROmc, supra note 8, at 916 (stating, "[tihere is no question that
criminal enforcement is EPA's most effective deterrent. Unlike a monetary
penalty, imprisonment is one cost that an environmental criminal cannot pass
on to consumers.") (footnote omitted). Additionally, a recent national survey
indicated that district attorneys consider the goal of deterrence more important
in prosecuting corporate officers than ordinary street criminals. MICHAEL L.
BENSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL PROSECUTORS AND CORPORATE
CRIME 5 (Jan. 1993). The survey also concluded that "a notable proportion of
prosecutors felt that corporate offenders deserve to be punished," with thirty-
five percent ranking retribution as the first or second most important objective
in prosecuting corporate officers. Id.
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Furthermore, several courts have commented that "criminal
penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to protect
public health ... are to be construed to effectuate the regulatory
purpose."128 In enacting RCRA, Congress intended, as it did
similarly in enacting the FDCA,129 to protect the health of the
general public in the face of the hazards of modern society.180 In
both statutes Congress treated the problem of the difficulty of
convicting corporate officers for their subordinates' illegal activ-
ity.13 1 The MacDonald & Watson court acknowledged that
"RCRA is a public welfare statute 'enacted to protect the na-
tional health and environment 13 2 ... and to provide 'nationwide
protection against the dangers of improper hazardous waste
disposal."1 33
Moreover, the Supreme Court has embraced the reasoning
of the RCO doctrine in other types of cases involving "knowing"
crimes' 34 in order to implement congressional intent. For exam-
ple, focusing on the issue of public health, the Supreme Court
suggested in Liparota v. United States 3 5 that statutory con-
struction of public welfare statutes differs markedly from that of
other criminal statutes.'3 6 In Liparota, the Court rejected the
128. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir.
1984) (citing United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975)); Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,
280-81 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922)). One must
also consider, however, a counterbalancing canon, the Rule of Lenity, which
states that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be re-
solved in favor of lenity." Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985)
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15 (explaining that the Supreme
Court created the RCO doctrine in interpreting the FDCA).
130. See supra notes 40-41 and text accompanying note 39. Some commen-
tators, however, have argued that "public welfare offense" is a term of art that
necessarily does not include a mens rea requirement. Hansen, supra note 8, at
988, 1004-11; Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 8, at 10147.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 118-121.
132. 933 F.2d at 46 (quoting Wyckoff Co. v. E.P-.A, 796 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
133. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6249).
134. United States v. International Minerals, 402 U.S. 558 (1971); Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985).
135. The defendant in Liparota, co-owner of a drug store, purchased food
stamps from an undercover government agent at less than face value. Id. at
421. The defendant argued that he did not know his acts were unlawful and
thus, the statute did not reach his conduct. Id. at 422-23.
136. Id. at 432-33.
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government's contention that the Food Stamp Act' 37 is a "public
welfare offense" and therefore deserving of more lenient statu-
tory construction. 38 The Court distinguished food stamps from
items such as unregistered firearms, 139 hand grenades, 140 and
adulterated drugs, 141 thereby acknowledging that courts should
interpret statutes regulating such items differently. 142 Because
RCRA is undeniably a public welfare statute143 that regulates
inherently dangerous items like firearms and hand grenades,- 44
Liparota gives courts license to construe RCRA in a way that
furthers its public welfare goals.
In United States v. International Mineral & Chemical
Corp.,145 involving "knowing" mens rea, the Court gave special
treatment to public welfare statutes. The International Miner-
als court rejected defendant's claim that he had no knowledge of
a law requiring the listing of hazardous substances on shipping
papers. 146 The Court stated that where "dangerous or deleteri-
ous devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are in-
volved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who
is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them
must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."147 The Court
137. The Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1988), made it a felony to
"knowingly use[ ], transfer[ I.... or possess[ ] coupons... in any manner not
authorized" by the act. The Court held that "knowingly" modified every ele-
ment of the offense, and thus required the prosecution to show that the defend-
ant knew his act was unauthorized. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 433 (citing United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971)).
140. Id. (citing Freed, 401 U.S. at 609).
141. Id. (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943);
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)). The Liparota court stated: '[t]he
distinctions between these cases and the instant case are clear. A food stamp
can hardly be compared to a hand grenade [as in Freed] .. ., nor can the unau-
thorized acquisition or possession of food stamps be compared to the selling of
adulterated drugs, as in Dotterweich." Id.
142. The court distinguished the Food Stamp Act from "public welfare of-
fenses," which it defined as those offenses in which "Congress has rendered
criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to
stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's health
or safety." Id.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
144. See Morgan & Obermann, supra note 8, at 1203 (stating, "corporate
officials in industries regulated by environmental statutes would be wise to
think of themselves as owners of hand grenades, the shrapnel from which can
readily pierce the corporate veil").
145. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
146. Id. at 563.
147. Id. at 565. Many courts have cited this language in interpreting the
term "knowingly" in the context of RCRA. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 969
F.2d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1852 (1993); United States
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thus demonstrated its willingness to construe the mens rea of
public welfare statutes differently from other statutes. 148
C. SUGGESTED APPLICATION OF THE RCO DocTRINE
Courts should adapt the RCO doctrine to give effect to both
RCRA's "knowingly" requirement and the congressional intent
of protecting the public health. Courts could implement this
doctrine in the form of a jury instruction. 149 For example, in
MacDonald & Watson, the trial court could have instructed the
jury as follows:
If you find:
" first, that the person is an officer of the corporation, not merely an
employee;
" second, that the officer had direct responsibility for the activities
that are alleged to be illegal. Simply being an officer or even the
president of a corporation is not enough; and
" third, that the officer had some information regarding this offense,
and must have known or believed that the illegal activity of the type
alleged occurred; then you may find that the defendant had knowl-
v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991);
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502
(1986).
The International Minerals Court held that the government need not prove
that the defendant knew his act or omission was illegal. Id. at 559-563. The
Court thus upheld a charge of knowingly failing to show the classification of
sulfuric acid and hydrofluosilicic acid on shipping papers. Central to the court's
reasoning was "the principle that ignorance of the law is no defense." Id. at
563. The Court further stated that "[a] person thinking in good faith that he
was shipping distilled water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid
would not be covered." Id. at 563-64.
148. The Court also distinguished regulations of dangerous materials, such
as hand grenades, drugs and acids, from those regulating innocuous materials,
such as pencils, dental floss and paper clips. Id. at 564.
149. Of course, Congress could also write some version of the RCO doctrine
into the knowledge requirement, eliminating all ambiguity regarding the doc-
trine's application. For example, in Minnesota, the criminal code includes
within its definition of "knowledge":
Knowledge of a corporate official may be established under paragraph
(a) or by proof that the person is a responsible corporate official. To
prove that a person is a responsible corporate official, it must be shown
that:
(1) the person is an official of the corporation, not merely an
employee;
(2) the person has direct control of or supervisory responsibility for
the activities related to the alleged violation, but not solely that the
person held a certain job or position in a corporation; and
(3) the person had information regarding the offense for which the
defendant is charged that would lead a reasonable and prudent person
in the defendant's position to learn of the actual facts.
Minn. Stat. § 609.671 subd. 2(b) (1992).
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edge of the act in question. You are not required to draw such a
conclusion, and to find the defendant guilty you still must be con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowl-
edge of the act.1 50
This proposed instruction would safeguard defendants' rights
and at the same time provide the necessary guidance to juries to
facilitate accurate criminal convictions and protect the public
health.151
1. Safeguarding RCRA Defendants' Rights
The proposed instruction safeguards defendants' rights in
three ways. First, it takes the form of a permissive inference
because the court tells the jury that it may, but is not required
150. In their 1993 article, Hartman & De Monaco state that the government
has recently requested the following circumstantial evidence jury instruction:
Among the circumstances you may consider in determining a defend-
ant's knowledge is his position in the corporation, including his respon-
sibilities under the regulations and under any applicable corporate
policies and his activities as a corporate executive. Thus, you may in-
fer that the defendant knew certain facts by virtue of his position in
the corporation, his relationship to other employees or any applicable
corporate policies and other facts and circumstances including infor-
mation provided to the defendant on prior occasions. If the defendant
was an officer of the corporation, you may consider whether the de-
fendant was the corporate officer who had primary and direct responsi-
bility over the activities which gave rise to the violations charged in
determining whether he had knowledge of the charged violations.
Supra note 8, at 10153. This Comment's proposed instruction preserves the
RCO doctrine and therefore better protects both human health and the environ-
ment. It is also shorter, more straightforward and therefore less apt to confuse
the jury. One commentator has explained that complex instructions are "indic-
ative of an unwillingness in the law to refine difficult questions." Kramer &
Koenig, supra note 56, at 407. "It is easier to leave technical and expansive jury
instructions in a form that may be incomprehensible to the lay person because
legal terminology is not ordinarily grounds for reversal." Id. To this effect, the
MacDonald & Watson instruction regarding circumstantial evidence is prefera-
ble: "Whether a Defendant acted knowingly or with knowledge of a particular
fact may be inferred from that Defendant's conduct, from that Defendant's fa-
miliarity with the subject matter in question or from all of the other facts and
circumstances connected with the case." 933 F.2d 35, 52 n.15 (1st Cir. 1991)
(also reproducing a standard definition of "knowingly"). See also Joseph G.
Block & Nancy A. Voisin, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine-Can You
Go to Jail for What You Don't Know?, 22 ENvT. L. 1347, 1374 (1992) (proposing
a simple circumstantial evidence jury instruction).
151. Of course, this instruction is meant to complement existing instruc-
tions regarding the word "knowingly." When appropriate, courts should con-
tinue to deliver circumstantial evidence and willfifl blindness instructions,
which are largely beyond the scope of this article.
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to, accept the inference. 152 The instruction does not require the
jury to make the jump from the elements of the instruction to a
finding of knowledge. 153 Rather, the jury decides for itself
whether to accept this inference in light of all the evidence. The
permissive inference form thus removes the conclusive presump-
tion problem of MacDonald & Watson.154
Second, the proposed instruction requires that the jury find
defendant's knowledge "beyond a reasonable doubt thus calling
attention to this specific element's importance."155 The require-
152. Hartman & De Monaco agree that permissive inference instructions
are generally valid, but seemingly disagree that courts should employ some
form of the RCO doctrine. Supra note 8, at 10152.
One commentator has suggested what may be a valid RCO conclusive pre-
sumption instruction in which a jury will find knowledge if it finds: "(1) that a
RCRA violation occurred within an officer's area of supervision and control; (2)
that the officer had the authority or power to prevent or correct the violation;
and (3) that the officer knowingly failed to do so." Barrett & Clarke, supra note
33, at 884. The author explained that the third factor is "the linchpin" of apply-
ing the doctrine:
For the jury to infer that a corporate officer had knowledge of the viola-
tion he is alleged to have committed, the government must establish
that the officer was aware of a preexisting violation or potential viola-
tion. Failure to act upon the violation he is charged with, despite this
prior notice, in conjunction with the first two factors set forth above,
satisfies the "knowing" requirement under section 6928(d) of RCRA.
Id. This instruction may be problematic because the requirement that the of-
ficer be aware of "a preexisting violation" may be similar to the MacDonald &
Watson "of the type alleged" problem. See supra text accompanying notes 101-
102.
153. The instruction Hartman & De Monaco propose seemingly fails to in-
struct the jury that it is not required to draw any conclusions from the circum-
stances specified in the instruction. For text of the instruction, see supra note
150. This protection of the defendant is essential because juries often do not
understand the significance of legal jargon in an instruction. See Mills v. Mary-
land, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988) (explaining that on review a court will examine
what the jury reasonably understood); see also Kramer & Koenig, supra note 58
(explaining that jurors tend not to understand complex instructions). But see
LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 46, § 2.13(a)(1), at 159-60 (arguing that a permis-
sive inference instruction disadvantages the defendant "by persuading the jury
that may convict solely upon proof of the basic fact, a conclusion the jury might
not otherwise reach").
154. 933 F.2d at 50; see also supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. In
conclusive presumptions, the likelihood of error is great. For example, the four
seemingly innocuous words---of the type alleged"-mandated reversal in Mac-
Donald & Watson. See supra text accompanying notes 101-102.
155. Although any instruction will probably recognize a "beyond a reason-
able doubt" requirement, this instruction specifically addresses the knowledge
requirement. See McCoRMcK ON EVMENCE supra note 61, § 348(4), at 599
(stating that the court is required to give this part of the instruction). In light
of McCormick's suggestions, the judge should also instruct the jury that it must
find each of the three elements beyond a reasonable doubt because the pre-
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ment that the jury may not convict a defendant solely for being a
corporate officer further complements the reasonable doubt re-
quirement regarding knowledge. The judge communicates to
the jury in plain terms that it may not hold defendant strictly
liable,156 and the jury must base its conclusion that defendant
acted "knowingly" on evidence beyond corporate officer status.
Appellate courts are more likely to uphold this instruction
because it is a permissive inference that is rational.15 7 Like the
MacDonald & Watson instruction, this instruction requires that
the corporate officer defendant had direct responsibility over the
illegal activity and knew of illegal activity "of the type al-
leged."' s8 The proposed instruction further provides that the de-
sumed fact, knowledge, is an essential element of the offense. Id. The Uniform
Rules of Evidence provide an example:
Whenever the existence of a presumed fact... is submitted to the jury,
the court shall instruct the jury that it may regard the basic facts as
sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but is not required to do so. In
addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the
offense or negatives a defense, the court shall instruct the jury that its
existence, on all the evidence, must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
UNnw. R. Evm. 303(c) (1986).
The emphasis on defendant protection in specifying to the jury that it may
reject any inferences and that it must find knowledge beyond a reasonable
doubt differs from the instruction proposed by Hartman & De Monaco, which
seemingly has neither attribute. For the language of Hartman & De Monaco's
proposed instruction, see supra note 150. As one commentator has emphasized,
"Because every conviction has the potential to stigmatize a defendant in a dif-
ferent way, before the government can claim the right to label the defendant as
a certain kind of criminal, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
label fits." Saltzburg, supra note 63, at 421; see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414
U.S. 141, 14748 (1973) (giving weight to the trial court's instruction that the
jury must find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in upholding a
"presumption of truthfulness" instruction); United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d
619, 623 (3d Cir. 1987) (upholding an instruction because "[t]he trial court prop-
erly informed the jury that the Government bears the burden of establishing
each element of the offenses by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.")
156. See generally Steven Zipperman, The Park Doctrine-Application of
Strict Criminal Liability to Corporate Individuals for Violations of Environmen-
tal Statutes, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'y 123 (1991).
157. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining that courts will
uphold rational permissive inference instructions on review). Indeed, the infer-
ence drawn in the proposed instruction seems more rational than the inference
in Ulster County Court v. Allen, which arguably "did not fairly reflect what com-
mon sense and experience tell us about passengers in automobiles and the pos-
session of handguns." 442 U.S. 140, 173 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
158. See supra text accompanying note 76 (reproducing the MacDonald &
Watson instruction). This MacDonald & Watson instruction would probably
pass constitutional muster as a permissive inference. Hartman & De Monaco,
supra note 8, at 10152. For example, the Supreme Court stated in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co. that it would have been correct in that case
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fendant must have had "some information regarding this
offense."159 This "information" provides a crucial nexus between
the specifically charged illegal activity and the illegal activity "of
the type alleged." A jury could not, therefore, conclude that de-
fendant knew about this offense merely because defendant knew
about a similar violation some years previous. 160 Rather, the
prosecution must come forward with some evidence linking de-
fendant to the alleged felony, such as evidence of a phone call to
an unpermitted transporter, some statement relating to the
shipment, or a receipt bearing defendant's signature reflecting
unusually low prices for services rendered. 161
2. Protecting Public Health & the Environment
The proposed instruction provides important guidance to
the jury by letting it know which basic facts the court deems
sufficient to infer the requisite mens rea of "knowingly."162 This
guidance facilitates accurate criminal convictions of high level
for the court to have instructed the jury that it may infer intent from certain
facts, but that it was not required to do so. 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978). Because
the instruction requires knowledge of illegal activity "of the type alleged," this
exact version of the RCO doctrine will not apply to every case. This instruction
is designed for cases like MacDonald & Watson and United States v. Park, in
which the corporate officer had some warning of past violations, or the prosecu-
tion has some other evidence regarding previous similar violations. As in any
case, the prosecutors must select their appropriate charge.
159. This part of the proposed instruction draws on the statutory Minnesota
RCO doctrine. See supra note 149.
160. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining this problem in
MacDonald & Watson).
161. The Eleventh Circuit has stated, "It is common knowledge that prop-
erly disposing of wastes is an expensive task, and if someone is willing to take
away wastes at an unusual price or under unusual circumstances, then a juror
can infer that the transporter knows that the wastes are not being taken to a
permit facility." United States v. Hayes Intl Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th
Cir. 1986).
162. The Supreme Court has stated, "[Ilnstructions bearing on the burden of
proof, just as those bearing on the weight to be accorded different types of testi-
mony and other familiar subjects of jury instructions, are in one way or another
designed to get the jury off dead center and give it some guidance by which to
evaluate the frequently confusing and conflicting testimony which it has
heard." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1973); see also United States
v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 623 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating, "[a] district judge pro-
vides the jury with guidance, to enable it to draw the appropriate conclusions
from the testimony"); United States v. Holland, 537 F.2d 821, 823 (5th Cir.
1976) (stating that it does not invade the province of the jury to furnish some
guidance to jurors's deliberations).
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corporate officers.' 63 Conversely, by removing the ambiguity
from the term "knowingly," this instruction will eliminate inac-
curate convictions. Consequently, RCRA will serve to deter cor-
porate officers from engaging in conduct that they know to be
illegal and will encourage corporate officers to engage in in-
formed conduct in the operation of their businesses. x64 This re-
duction in illegal activity and increase in careful management
will better protect public health and the environment.
In MacDonald & Watson, given the overwhelming evidence
against D'Allesandro, the jury likely would have found him
guilty based on the proposed instruction.' 65 Nevertheless, be-
cause the jury would be free to reject any inferences, the door
would have remained open to his acquittal.' 66
163. Similarly, in People v. Roder, the California Supreme Court found the
following statutory presumption of knowledge of possession of stolen property
unconstitutional:
if [the jury] found (1) that defendant was a dealer in secondhand mer-
chandise, (2) that he had bought or received stolen property, (3) that he
bought or received such property under circumstances which should
have caused him to make reasonable inquiry that the person from
whom the property was bought had the legal right to sell it, and (4)
that he did not make such reasonable inquiry, 'then you shall presume
that defendant bought or received such property knowing it to have
been stolen ....
658 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Cal. 1983) (en banc). The California Supreme Court in-
structed the trial courts to make the statutory mandatory presumption into a
permissive inference. 658 P.2d at 1312. The court stated that "a carefully
drafted instruction which places the inference in context and does no more than
inform the jury that upon the prosecution's proof of the four basic facts it is
permitted-but not required-to infer guilty knowledge is fairly innocuous."
Id.
164. See, e.g., Roder, 658 P.2d at 1313 (explaining that two functions of a
permissive inference are to guide the jury and to serve as an incentive for po-
tential defendants to engage in informed conduct).
165. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text (explaining that
D'Allesandro was a hands on manager with direct responsibility and had been
previously warned of similar violations).
166. For example, it is possible that ajury may have believed that he did not
know of the illegal acts. Moreover, a corporate officer who takes special precau-
tions to be aware of the activities of her subordinates will be less likely to face
prosecution and conviction because such evidence will necessarily rebut the
conclusion that she knew of the specific illegal activity. In the actual MacDon-
ald & Watson case, the district court began the retrial of D'Allesandro on Janu-
ary 15, 1992 for shipping hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility. U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FY 1993 ENFORCEMENT AccoAwLisHmNTs REPORT
§ 3-102 (1993). The court acquitted D'Allesandro at the close of the govern-
ment's case. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Corporate officers across the country have grown nervous as
federal courts have applied RCO doctrine reasoning to RCRA's
criminal provisions. 167 In MacDonald & Watson, the First Cir-
cuit examined whether the mens rea requirement of RCRA
§ 6928(d)(1) permits the court to employ some form of the RCO
doctrine to establish a corporate officer's knowledge of specific
illegal acts. The First Circuit correctly held that the RCO doc-
trine, as stated by the district court, incorrectly created a
mandatory presumption of knowledge of illegal acts. Courts
should nonetheless adapt the doctrine to incorporate the "know-
ingly" requirement and to serve as a guide to juries. By utilizing
the suggested permissive inference jury instruction, courts can
further the policy of protecting the public health and, at the
same time, protect the rights of RCRA defendants.
167. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Hodson & Sarah N. McGiffert, The Prosecution of
Corporations and Corporate Officers for Environmental Crimes: Limiting One's
Exposure for Environmental Criminal Liability, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 509 (1992);
ALAN ZARKY, DEFENDING THE CORPORATION IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: A
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER AND COL-
LECTIVE KNOWLEDGE DoCTRINEs (1990).
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